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THE MANITOBA SCHOOL QUESTION.

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IN the July number of the CANADIAN MAGAZINE, I pleaded for liberty of thought and opinion. As one argument, I suggested that possibly even the cockiest bigot might be wrong; and I mentioned a few out of the millions of opinions that had already gone to the ditch. Might his not go, too? "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it *possible* you may be mistaken." After seven pages, I summarized the proposition to which I had "been endeavoring to win assent," as follows:— "(1) That human thought is, even the best of it, upon social and religious questions, far from infallible; (2) That other people of equal intelligence, who honestly differ with us, are as likely to be right as we are; (3) That religious and irreligious opinion is in the category of the debatable . . .; (4) That the true policy, with reference to all *such* questions, is that of perfect liberty; for the *onus* of proving the harmfulness of opposing opinion cannot be discharged." Then follow four pages wherein I applied these principles to the schools.

The Rev. Dr. Bryce, in the September number, makes reply, and that in the very simplest manner possible. He puts into my pages opinions and contentions that are not there, and, so far as I am aware, I never entertained; and then, without much effort, victoriously confutes them. He might have spared himself the confutation, for the poor, miserable things, with all possible shifts, straddles, and devices, could never have stood upright, even if left alone. The worthy Doctor would have accomplished all his purpose, had he contented himself with saying, in a single sentence, "Mr. Ewart's whole article is a foolish defence of the geo-

centric theory." My discomfiture would thus have been sufficiently apparent to all men, without wasting pages to disprove the antiquated absurdity.

Not that Dr. Bryce had the slightest intention of misrepresenting me. He is merely a singularly good example of that "incapacity to appreciate and sympathetically understand an opinion contrary to his own," to which I referred in July. Instead of either understanding my argument, or telling me that it was something "no fellow could understand," he flings a heap of wretched inanities at me, saying: Your opinion is that "my right is your wrong; my wrong is your right. One for me is as good as the other for you. *There is no fixed right.* There is no hope of reaching a common standard . . . Plainly Mr. Ewart believes there is no common standard of opinion; that *there can be no consensus of right*; that there can be no invariable principle in man which can serve as a basis of agreement, and hence of truth. That being the case, then each must be allowed to believe and *act* as he likes. Absolute, unrestrained liberty *to do* as he may choose must be given him. He might just as well have added, "And Mr. Ewart believes that alligators are Divine emanations, and ought to be protected with forty-five per cent." He seems to say:—

"As for you,
Say what you can, my false o'erweighs your
true."

In order to justify his ascription to me of these absurdities, Dr. Bryce quotes four passages from my article. They are as follows (numbered and italicised):—

FIRST PASSAGE.—"If we cannot decide (and Mr. Ewart says we cannot

decide) whether the opinions are harmful or innocent, A has as much right to have his way as B, has he not?" What opinions was I alluding to? Whether alligators are emanations, or not? Whether A. is to have "absolute and unrestrained liberty to do as he may choose," or not? No, neither of them; but whether atheistical opinions are so certainly harmful to society as to warrant the State in suppressing them. That is what I said could not be decided. Was I not right?

SECOND PASSAGE:—"Your opinions are not entitled to one whit greater deference or respect than are the opinions of others." If Dr. Bryce refuses to admit "that other people of equal intelligence, who honestly differ with him, are as likely to be right as he is," then, in all politeness, I shall make an exception in his favor. With this qualification, I believe the statement to be perfectly accurate. Nevertheless I will reverse it entirely, if he wishes, and say that every person's opinions are entitled to "greater deference and respect than are the opinions of others." But it must be understood that the change was made to oblige Dr. Bryce. Plato, more modest than the Doctor, would have said: (a) "To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions is an attribute of the Gods, not given to man, stranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think."

THIRD PASSAGE:—"Religious and irreligious opinion is in the category of the debatable; the true policy with reference to all such questions is perfect liberty." With the same understanding I will reverse this, too. I shall say: Religious questions are not "in the category of the debatable;" that from the time of Elijah and the prophets of Baal, down to the time of Prof. Briggs and Prof. Campbell, they never have been debated. I shall further say that "the true policy with reference to all such questions is" not

that of liberty at all, perfect or otherwise; but that of the Doctor's Confession of Faith in the words following: "The civil magistrate . . . hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order that unity and peace be preserved in the church; that the truth of God be kept pure and entire; that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed; all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented, or reformed; and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better effecting thereof, he hath power to call synods, to be present at them, and to provide that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God."

It must, however, again be most distinctly understood that the change was made to oblige Dr. Bryce. (I find myself still muttering something like "E pur si muove.")

FOURTH PASSAGE:—"In the name of liberty, I would say to the parents: Certainly you have the right to teach, or have taught, to your children anything you like, so long as you can agree about it." Robbed of all its own context, and surrounded with a totally different one, this sentence might be taken to mean, that I thought that parents were acting quite properly, did they teach their children "Falsehoods, thieveries, iniquities, injustice, disloyalty, anarchic tendencies." With its own context it is plainly limited to Imperial Federationism, Militarism, Pietism, Sabbatarianism, Anti-alcoholism, and every other ism of such like you can think of.

These are the four quotations to prove that one of my principles must be that "absolute, unrestrained liberty to do as he may choose must be given him." Of course they are laughably worthless for that purpose; but they serve excellently another (probably not intended), namely, to show with what extraordinary fitness the Doctor selected, for his opening page, the words "Lord, thou knowest gif I dinna gae richt, I'll gang far wrang." In

(a) Laws, Bk. I.; Jowett's Trans. IV., 172.

future he can apostrophise all Canada as well.

But he goes much further "wrang" than this. Having tripped up quite successfully the rickety Aunt Sallys, that the first passing butterfly would have tumbled over, he proceeds to enunciate three propositions which he says are "in opposition to these views." Three propositions—every one of them as certain, as well known, and as broad-based as Ararat, Blanc or his own Nevis! Three propositions—and not one of them in opposition to anything—so far as my views are concerned. On the contrary, while the first of them is as irrelevant as would be any proposition in Euclid, the other two are among the foundations of my July argument. These are the three (numbered consecutively and italicized):—

I. *"That the State has a right to form, and enforce, an opinion, at variance with the opinions of many of its subjects."* Why this platitude, rather than any other—"Some things are good to eat," for example—I cannot imagine. "The State has a perfect right to form, and enforce an opinion" upon some matters "at variance with the opinions of many of its subjects," is, surely, what the Doctor intends. He does not mean that the State ought to form, and enforce, an opinion upon all matters—upon the literary value of the Psalms, upon the use of meat on fast-days, upon attendance at church, etc. He does not advocate (probably) the return to Acts of Conformity, and Test Acts. His proposition, if intended to be universal, is unquestionably wrong. If intended to be limited, it is perfectly correct, but at the same time perfectly worthless; for there always remains to be proved, that the matter under discussion is one of those upon which the State may form and enforce an opinion. "Far wrang!"

II. *"The writer further contends that the State, being founded on justice,*

may not give special privileges to any class of its subjects." Most certainly, Doctor; that is what I was hitting at, and you were objecting to, when I said: "A has as much right to have his way as B, has he not?" "Your opinions are not entitled to one whit greater deference or respect, than are the opinions of others;" and "The true policy with reference to all such questions is perfect liberty." A few pages ago you said that "these are the elementary principles of anarchy." What do you think of them now? "No special privileges to any class of its subjects,"—let us adhere to that, for it is good.

And it is not in the least opposed to my views, as the Doctor seems to think. He says: "What does Mr. Ewart propose? He proposes that the people of Manitoba should have their public schools, and that one denomination should be singled out, and be allowed to teach their 'isms,' in certain schools, to be controlled by them." To which I can only reply that I never proposed any such thing; or anything having the faintest resemblance to it, and that the whole drift of my article is entirely opposed to any such notion, and directly contrary to any such contention. "Far wrang!" "Far wrang!"

The Doctor tries in another way to make it appear that my purpose is as he alleges. He says that I "was most strenuous, when pleading the Roman Catholic position before the courts, in insisting that Episcopalian and Presbyterians had no rights in the same way." Which is to say, that because I argued as to the meaning of certain words, in a certain statute, therefore my contention must be that that statute, with that certain meaning, upon abstract principles is just and good. Far, "far wrang" again! A lawyer might argue as to the meaning of one of Dr. Bryce's sermons surely, without being compelled to justify it? But the Doctor is wrong, not only in his logic, but in his facts. I did not so argue, for I was not even

engaged in the case in which the question was debated. Once more "far wrang!"

Why does not the Doctor tell me that my real object is to destroy all belief in an isosceles triangle? And why, at all events, does he not doggedly adhere to that method of arguing, rather, at all events, than change to another very much worse? For, on the whole, I would much rather be told that I had said something that I did not, than have it alleged that the "mild, gentle-faced tolerance that Mr. Ewart pleads for, is not the reality for which he is arguing." This means, either that I am endeavoring to mislead, or that I do not know what I am arguing for—sufficiently uncomfortable horns both of them. I take comfort, however, in the fact that it is the "far wrang" Professor that so charges me, and the chances are infinity to one that he is "far wrang" again.

But what is this dreadful, or evasive, "reality, for which" I am arguing—this thing too horrible to mention, or too elusive for common apprehension? Veritably this: a desire to place the schools "under the control of the church"—that is, under the same kind of control as is the college in which Dr. Bryce has spent the best part of his life, as a most worthy and estimable professor! He sees nothing improper in *his* school being governed by a church, but deems the design of a similar government for other schools, a purpose altogether too heinous for public acknowledgment. Were he the Professor of "far wrang" (and I do not think he ever did lecture on exegesis), he could not go much further "wrang" than this, surely? He may endeavor to distinguish. He will say that his school is sustained by private subscription. The distinction does not appeal to me as having much validity. Some of my income goes directly to the support of his school, and some of it indirectly (through the tax-collector), to the support of the other schools. To me, it is either well, or ill, that all these

schools should be under church government—well or ill, that is, for the pupils. Whence come the salaries, can, by no means, affect the benefit or disadvantage to the children. He may urge, too, that theology is taught in his college, and that there is, therefore, for it, a necessity for church-government. But I do not refer to the theological department of his college, which, in numerical proportion, is but an adjunct of it; but to the larger body of the institution, the part in which the Doctor himself labors so successfully—to the ordinary every-day school for general education. Is church government for such schools well, or ill, Doctor? You spend a little of your time arguing for the suppression of them, because (1) "the only hope for the province was to * * have a vigorous effort made to raise up a homogeneous Canadian people;" and (2), "in order to make us a united people, a patriotic love of our province demands this expedient;" and you employ the main energies of your life in working in, and seeking support for, a particular school of that very class. I know that you can distinguish again, and that your church is always right, and the others always wrong; so do not tell me that. But, "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be" gone "far wrang!"

I say that this, the second of the Doctor's propositions, is not only not opposed to my views, but that it is one of the foundations of my July argument; and I further say that it is entirely opposed to the action of the Manitoba Government.

Let us suppose that there are in a community three classes of persons, each with desires and ideas in reference to education. There are (A) those who desire it to be purely secular; (B) those who desire to have a certain spice, or flavor, of religion in it; and (C) those who desire to have it distinctly religious-history-taught, as in the Old Testament (God acting all the time), and not as in Gibbon (chance

and circumstance at play). And now, Doctor, what I want to know is: How, upon the "no special privilege" plan, you pick out B, and determine that *he* must have his way? Do you say that B is in the majority? Very well, then we must amend our principle, and say "that the State may not give special privileges to any class of its subjects," *except the majority*. Is it right now? If you think so, take it down to Quebec, set it to work, and watch it a little while. You will change your mind!

III. The last of the broad-based propositions (said to be opposed to my contentions), for which the Rev. Doctor contends is, "*That religion is outside of State interference, unless religion invade the State's domain.*" But this is *not* opposed to my contentions. On the contrary it is one of them, and the one to which I constantly make appeal as against the action of the Manitoba Legislature. What did that Legislature do? There were two sets of schools in existence—in one was a little religion suitable to Protestants, and in the other a little more religion suitable to Catholics. Under such circumstances, if the Doctor desires to know "What could patriotic Manitobans do?" I can have no objection to say, that if in the name of patriotism (or of all biology), they felt bound to abolish the one set of schools, and to strengthen the other, they could not have hit upon a more stupid reason for their action than that "religion [*all religion that is*] is outside of State interference." Any first-come law of dynamics (the science which treats of the action of force), would have been much more appropriate. Surely, far "far wrang!"

For religion has not been removed from the schools. Episcopalian and Presbyterian Synods thank God annually that it is still there; while Roman Catholics bemoan its character. At present religion is taught, but reluctantly, indirectly, circuitously, and as though people were ashamed of it. This may be taught,

and that may not. The Bible may be read, but it must be read "without note or comment." The meaning of words probably cannot be given; the local customs, or notions, must not be referred to; the connection with the previous chapter must not be pointed out. Christ's life is to be read in this foolish fashion, and in detached snatches, with a minimum of ten verses at a time; but no one must say a word to help the children to understand or appreciate it. All which, to my mind, is worse than making a fetish of the Bible; it is making a bore and an annoyance of it. Why does not some Educationist propose that History or Philosophy be taught in the same way? There must be no note or comment on the Bible; but, on the other hand, some of the means to be employed for "instruction in moral principles," are "stories, memory-gems . . . didactic talks, teaching the Ten Commandments, etc." Should the Professor again write upon the School question, I beg of him to tell us, (1) Whether, working under these prescriptions, religion is, or is not, taught in the schools; (2) Whether religion ought to be taught in the schools; and (3) If yea, how it comes that his maxim, "that religion is outside of State interference," leads to State-directed religion in State schools. And let me anticipate one of his replies: "Yes, there is religion in the schools, but it is purely of a non-sectarian character." I shall still (1) ask him to apply his maxim, or to submit to its amendment, so that it shall read "Religion, other than non-sectarian religion, is outside of State interference;" but further, (2) I shall beg him to remember (as said D'Israeli) that, "a non-sectarian religion is a new religion." "Non-sectarian" is it? Look at the "Form of Prayer," and tell me if any Jew or Unitarian would join in it. Read at one sitting a Presbyterian and a Roman Catholic catechism; and see what they would respectively make of "teaching the Ten Commandments."

Will Dr. Bryce say that he would consent to Roman Catholics, in their way, "teaching the Ten Commandments" to Protestant children? Of course he will not, but he thinks it quite right in the name of "patriotism," and of "homogeneity," and of "a united people," to require Roman Catholic children to take their ideas from Protestant teachers. As he says, "a patriotic love of our province demands this expedient." "Far wrang!" "Far wrang!" Toujours perdrix!

One more effort to make myself understood. In my July article, quoting from Dr. Bryce, I said, that of the Catholic school districts, "all but a very small percentage, are in localities almost entirely French." And I added, "Manitoba has said to a large section of her people": Unless you undertake to stop teaching your own religion, to your own children, in schools to which no one goes except those of your own faith, we will not permit you to organize yourselves together for the instruction of those in whose education the whole community has a decided interest." This is too true to be denied, and the Doctor does not deny it. He contents himself with denying the motive which actuated it. Let the motive go; there is the fearful fact. Catholics are thrown upon voluntary effort, and subscription, *unless they will abandon that which is to them a sacred duty*. If this be not intolerance and persecution, then the world never saw those horrid monsters and never will see them.

Dr. Bryce helps me splendidly here: "Probably most would say that should Roman Catholics or others desire to educate their children in private schools at their own expense, so long as illiteracy does not result it would be well to allow it." There are three conditions—(1) "private schools"; (2) "at their own expense;" and (3) "so long as illiteracy does not result." The difference between private and public schools (apart from expense) is that in the latter there is public in-

spection and oversight, a common standard, control by the vote of the people. It could be no reason for *not* allowing Roman Catholics to educate their children that they were willing to permit public inspection and oversight, to adopt the common standard, and to substitute control by the people for control by the church. Upon the contrary, this would evidently remove an objection quite formidable to many minds, and make Manitobans all the more willing, one would think, to allow the Roman Catholics to proceed in their own way. Shall we, therefore, rub out the first condition? By so doing we shall also dispose of the third, shall we not? Where are we now? We have Catholics in public schools, under public regulation, governed by the people, working up to a common standard. Well, then, the only condition left is—"at their own expense," and they (*mirabile dictu*) unanimously reply, "Why, certainly! We do not want a sixpence of anybody's money but our own." What do they propose? Merely this, (they are not beggars, although most of them are poor), that they should be allowed to organize *themselves* for the purpose of *taxing themselves* to raise money for *their own schools*.

Take an example. In the district of X. there is an exclusively Roman Catholic population. Up to 1890 there was a State school there. To-day there is none. (This is what is known as providing "one public school for each locality.") The people, therefore, pay no taxes for school purposes at all. They contribute voluntarily, but not in a sufficiently systematic way, for the purpose of providing private education for their children. They want power to tax themselves, in order better to support their schools—schools which shall have all the qualities of public schools. And Manitobans ("as Mr. Ewart knows, are a generous people") reply: "Certainly you may do so, but upon one condition. You must promise to

read the Bible 'without note or comment' of any kind, and either refrain from teaching religion altogether, or else adopt and teach this emasculated thing called 'non-sectarian religion.' This is our ultimatum. Accept, or go and be hanged—you and your children." "A patriotic love of our province demands this expedient," coolly adds Dr. Bryce, seated comfortably in his study, and continues to act on the exact contrary of "this expedient."

In addition to the right to tax themselves, and as something which Manitobans may or may not, according to their sense of justice (no one asks for generosity), withhold, the Catholics further propose this: Out of public funds there is paid to each school a certain sum in aid of the amount raised by taxation. These public funds belong to the people, Protestants and Roman Catholics alike, and "the State, being founded on justice, may not give special privileges to any class of its subjects." The people of district X say: Give us our share. We will conform to all your secular requirements, to inspections, to regulations, to standards; "Religion is outside of State interference;" leave it, therefore, outside of your regulations. Pay us our share, if in every respect we do the proper and efficient work of a secular school. And "generous" Manitobans reply: No; your school may be the best in the Province, but you will not get a cent if you comment on the Bible. When we said that "religion was outside of State interference," we meant that the State could quite properly interfere with the teaching of religion, and that, by one of the most drastic of penalties, namely, the threatened illiteracy of your children, it could with the most perfect justice, indeed, in the exercise of much generosity, prevent Catholics teaching Catholic children the Catholic religion in the only way in which Catholics believe it can effectively be done.

Let us dissect a little this seemingly simple proposition, "Religion is outside of State interference," and let us distinguish, because in *not* understanding it, simple as it is, lie many difficulties for many people. Guizot says^a that Church and State have maintained four forms of relations to one another:—(1) "The State is subordinate to the Church;" (2) "It is not the State which is in the Church but the Church which is in the State;" (3) "The Church ought to be independent, unrestricted in the State; the State has nothing to do with her; the temporal power ought to take no cognizance of religious creeds;" (4) "The Church and the State are distinct societies, it is true, but they are at the same time close neighbors, and are nearly interested in one another; let them live separate but not estranged; let them keep up an alliance on certain conditions, each living to itself, but each making sacrifices for the other; in case of need each lending the other its support."

Many people apprehend clearly enough the two first situations, but the last are usually jargogled together. And yet what a wide difference between them. Under the one principle, a man-of-war goes to sea, and many of her crew go to their graves beneath the water, without the services or offices of a clergyman. Under the other, the State recognizes the *fact* of religion (although refusing to say anything as to its truth), and, among each ship's officers, places one of the spirituality. The State in this case has regard to the wants of the crew. Even as provision is made for food and raiment as wants, so provision is made for *de facto* spiritual wants. It may be considered by many to be a very foolish thing to wish to have a clergyman with you on a battle-ship; even as others think it very absurd to want "baccy" or grog. But the State recognizes the *existence* of these wants (not their wisdom), and

^a Civilization in France, Lect. 3, Vol. I, p. 317, and see Lect. 12, Vol. II, p. 27.

refuses the men neither the one nor the other. Again, under the one principle, the name of God, and everything which could suggest the fact of religion, is excluded from the schools. While under the other, the State takes cognizance of the existence of religion; and the wants of the parents respecting it are, so far as practicable, recognized and acceded to. The distinction is now, I think, sufficiently clear. Which of them is correct? To my mind, he who is actuated by the true spirit of liberty will undoubtedly choose the latter.

With this understanding, let us return to Dr. Bryce's proposition, "*Religion is outside of State interference.*" By this is properly meant that, revolving as they do in different orbits, they ought not to collide with, or clash, or oppose one another. It does not mean that one can deny the existence of the other, or act as though it did not exist, or invade the territory of the other, saying, "Make way, for we must not collide." It means, so far as the State's action is concerned, that the *fact* that religion exists must be recognized; and that in so far as its orderly observance and propagation are concerned, it is "*outside of State interference.*" Doctor Bryce himself concedes that "on the whole, the trend of modern thought is to allow as great liberty as possible to religious opinion."

Let us go back to District X. Prior to 1890, the school there was under State control and governance; the people taxed themselves to support the school; and, according to the secular work accomplished, they obtained the same assistance from public funds that other schools received. In addition to secular instruction, the children were taught the way of salvation, as believed by the parents of every child in the school. The State, true to principle, interposed no obstacle. It allowed as "great liberty as possible." It did not interfere. It did not oppose. It did not object. Then Manitobans ("as Mr. Ewart knows, a generous

people") informed these poor parishioners, that unless they would cease telling the children about Jesus, they would be deprived of their organization, they would lose their share of the public moneys, and might get along as best, (or as worst,) they could. Since then, the Government (the people have not yet approved the step) has had the astounding hardihood to send agents to these poor people to sympathize with them, and to urge them to forego their conscientious convictions, in order that they may have the pecuniary advantages of which, for their religion's sake, they were deprived. Than this, history records nothing more intolerant, and, but that it is done without proper reflection, more base. I use the word deliberately. These people have been taught to believe, and do most thoroughly believe, that it is their duty to provide a certain kind of education for their children. It is not proposed to remove this belief by argument. It is proposed to tempt these people with money to act contrary to their belief. If the word "base" is not too strong to apply to the Judas who exchanges conscience for mere cash; does not the tempter who, to accomplish a base betrayal, appeals to the basest of motives, also richly merit the same word.

And is it not in the last degree extraordinary, that of all principles, social or scientific, mundane or divine, or other whatsoever, the one which most strongly and clearly condemns such gross interference with religious liberty—*Religion is outside of State interference*—is the very principle selected by Dr. Bryce to support it? We must leave him, venturing and proffering this suggestion, namely, that if at any time he does "heartily join in the prayer of that fellow-countryman, who pleaded for heavenly direction, saying, 'Lord, gif I dinna gae richt, Thou knowest I'll gang far wrang,'" the proper hymn for the occasion would be, in my humble opinion, "For those at sea"—far, far at sea. Failing relief

by this method, I am afraid nothing remains but the traditional surgical operation!

Si quid per jocum dixi, nolito in serium convertere; for

Though they may gang a kennin wrang,
To step aside is human.

The few passages of my July article which escaped misconstruction at the hands of Dr. Bryce, have, at those of Mr. Le Sueur shared the general fate. This latter gentleman seems to think that one of my contentions was, that because opinion might be erroneous, therefore we ought to "shun the responsibility of putting any of our opinions into practice." This is not my "therefore," nor the proper "therefore;" but this rather: that as our opinions *may* be erroneous, we ought not *unnecessarily* to ride rough-shod over the opinions of others—that while acting upon our opinions, we should proceed, not as if they were certain to be right, but *as if, possibly, they might be wrong*; and that, therefore, if, in our economy, scope can be left, or made, for the free play of contrary opinion, left or made it ought to be. A general may be of opinion that the enemy is 40,000 strong. He ought to act upon that opinion; but he would be a fool if he made no provision for a sudden reversal of his idea.

Suppose that the city of London determined to establish a number of public hospitals, and that there came to be determined the question of the system of medicine to be adopted. Alderman A proposes the allopathic system (which he *knows* to be the best), and has the majority on his side. Alderman B, who is an homeopathist, urges that many of the people are of his way of thinking; that, possibly, the majority may be wrong; and that both kinds of hospitals ought to be established, so that people of both opinions may be accommodated. Alderman A says, "Certainly not. The majority must act upon its opinion, and not be deterred by the fact that

they may be entirely wrong. If homeopathists want special treatment they can have it at their own expense, and at other places." In such case, Alderman B, in my opinion, is, most undoubtedly, right. A is wrong, because he acts upon his opinion as though it were the "ultimate infallible credo." Is my meaning now clear?

This imagined case may be made further useful. Allopathic hospitals may be taken to represent Protestant schools, and homeopathic hospitals, Catholic schools. In such case Alderman C proposes that, inasmuch as the people are not agreed upon the question of medicine, there should not be any practice at all, of a sectarian character, in the hospitals. "We are all agreed," he says, "upon surgical matters; we are all agreed that nursing and low diet are beneficial in fever cases; there is much about which there is unanimity. There is a national mandate thus far. Let us, then, have non-sectarian hospitals, and if any patient wants more than that, let him pay for it out of his own pocket." Then, quoting Mr. Le Sueur, he adds: "Do not ask that the hospitals, which *all* agree, are not only useful, but necessary, shall be made subservient to the propagation of your peculiar ideas in these matters." Manitoba has established non-sectarian hospitals (as she chooses to call them), and many of the people will make no use of them. Could not Alderman B have given them a better idea?

Mr. Le Sueur gives me credit, also, for the "idea of handing over local minorities to local majorities, without any check from the general law of the land." My article was, as I understand it, one long argument *against* this idea—*against* the exercise of the power of majorities; and I am indebted to my critic for the great support which he gives me. The single sentence in my article which has led Mr. Le Sueur astray refers to *unanimities*, and not to majorities and minorities at all. "Practical unanimi-

ty," or the disregard of merely "eccentric, or isolated opinion," I, for one, can by no means translate into a "majority vote." And if I am asked, "What power does he look to, to check a school-district which, dispensing with practical unanimity, wants to introduce some fad into the school by a majority vote?" the answer is very simple: I look to the "check from the general law of the land," which my critic makes me say that I do not look to. I must have some little license to speak for myself.

Passing from these misconceptions, Mr. Le Sueur says that "the State may, therefore, be said to get a mandate to establish secular schools. Does the State get any similar mandate to teach theology in the schools?" I beg to recommend these sentences to Dr. Bryce, and to Manitobans in general. There is more point in them, I venture to say, than will be admitted; for they avoid the inconsistency of arguing from the principle of entire separation of Church and State, to the practice of teaching some certain limited religion in the schools, and the exclusion of a few degrees more of it. But Mr. Le Sueur is speaking beside the facts. If there was any mandate about which Manitobans were more emphatic than another, it was that the schools should *not* be secular. For the rest, the mandate of the majority was to continue non-sectarian schools, and the mandate of the minority to re-establish the old system. Mr. Le Sueur's argument, leading, as it does, to secular schools, therefore, may for present purposes be disregarded. The subject is interesting, but purely academic, so far as the pending controversy is concerned.

I have to thank Mr. Le Sueur for another sentence: "Liberty consists in being as little governed as possible, and in having the largest possible scope left for private initiative." Apply this to district X, and some scores of other districts in Manitoba.

In them, the Catholics, if "governed as little as possible," will be required to keep their schools up to certain secular standards; and will not be forbidden (for it is unnecessary) to comment on the Bible-reading of the day, if unanimously they desire to do so. Am I not right? Is it in the name of liberty, or of tyranny, that all such comment, when unanimously desired, is by law stringently prohibited? Is this imposing the will of other people upon them, or is it freedom to act as they like?

Mr. Le Sueur is more successful, if I may be allowed to say so, when he advocates the rights of the Catholics to "be allowed to count themselves out," as he expresses it. Suppose this was done, and that the Catholics of district X applied for a charter under which they could organize themselves for the support of education. This would not, surely, be refused them, so long as every other good purpose is being aided in similar fashion. The charter having been granted, suppose that the Catholics in district X all became members of the Association, and agreed to pay certain rates per annum into the exchequer, and to charge their properties with the amounts, Mr. Le Sueur would, I think, see nothing wrong in all this. How far would he then be away from the separate school system? He will say that the arrangements would be purely voluntary. He is aware that in Ontario every Catholic must support the public schools unless he *voluntarily* supports some separate school. Make the law the same in Manitoba, and give each school district a separate charter, or provide for all by one general law, as you wish. That difference, if insisted upon, would not cause much grumbling or discontent. Mr. Le Sueur is, I think, more with me than with Dr. Bryce to whom, nevertheless, he says, "Well done."

Winnipeg.